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W
hat is genocide? Can a state be held responsible for
its commission? What affirmative obligations do
states have to prevent genocide? The International
Court of Justice (ICJ) offered new answers to these
perennial questions on February 26, 2007, in Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)
(Bosnian Genocide). The Bosnian Genocide Court held that: (1)
Serbia violated its obligations under the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide
Convention)1 to prevent genocide in Srebrenica2 (the largest mass
murder in Europe since World War II), but did not have the req-
uisite specific intent to commit genocide; and (2) Serbia must fully
cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY).3 While clarifying state accountability, the deci-
sion has raised fundamental questions regarding the proliferation
of tribunals in international law, and the extent to which states
now have affirmative obligations to prevent genocide.4
Despite its strengths, the ICJ decision seems at odds with pre-
vious jurisprudence on the following points: (1) its focus on spe-
cific intent to the detriment of context; (2) its strict requirements
of state operational control; and (3) its expansive language as to
state duties to prevent genocide. This Article will first explore the
evidentiary requirements set forth by the ICJ for establishing spe-
cific intent. Next, it will specifically analyze the Court’s decision to
use the “effective control” standard from the Nicaragua case5
instead of the “operational control” standard from the ICTY in
Prosecutor v. Tadic.6 Finally, it will address the broad language of
the ICJ opinion as to the requirement that states take “all meas-
ures” to prevent genocide, interpreting it in light of continuing
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) responsibilities. Given
the strong persuasive authority of ICJ decisions, the Court being
the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, this case could
in turn increase the affirmative responsibility of states to prevent
genocide through humanitarian intervention.
Synopsis and Procedural History 
of Bosnian Genocide
On March 20, 1993, the Government of Bosnia and
Herzegovina filed an application with the ICJ instituting proceed-
ings against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in respect to a dis-
pute concerning alleged violations of the Genocide Convention.7
The Application invoked Article IX of the Genocide Convention
as the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction.8 At issue in the case was
whether the state of Serbia had committed genocide against the
Bosniaks at Srebrenica, and during subsequent war and peacetime
atrocities. Although the parties to the suit changed after its filing
due to the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, the ICJ ruled that
through the principle of res publica it still had jurisdiction to ren-
der a decision in the case consistent with its previous determina-
tion.9 In the nearly fourteen years following the initial filing, the
Court has ruled on provisional measures from all parties, memori-
als, counter-memorials, and the admissibility of expert testimony.
Oral arguments were finally held beginning on February 27, 2006,
with a final judgment issued on February 26, 2007.
Differences Between the ICJ Standard for 
State Responsibility and the Icty Standard 
for Individual Responsibility Have Lead to
Inconsistent Results in Genocide Cases
The Genocide Convention, which recognizes genocide as an
international crime,10 is concerned with the prosecution of indi-
viduals who perpetrate genocide, as well as with states’ implemen-
tation of legislation to punish genocide.11 Article II of the
Convention defines acts of genocide as “any...acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group.”12 The Convention does not quantify the propor-
tion of a population that must be destroyed before genocide can
legally be said to have occurred. Beyond including ICJ jurisdiction
to hear disputes specifically “relating to the responsibility of a state
for genocide,”13 Article IX imposes extensive obligations on states
to prevent or be held accountable for genocide. Moreover, Article
V requires that the Contracting Parties enact legislation that would
impose penalties on individuals found guilty of genocide, while
Article VIII allows states to ask the UN to take action to prevent
and suppress genocide.14 Yet the standard for state responsibility
for genocide remained unclear until Bosnian Genocide.
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States May be Held Responsible for Committing
Genocide Under International Law
For the first time in legal history, and of the four genocide
cases that have come before the ICJ, the Court unequivocally held
in Bosnian Genocide that, rather than simply having to punish
individual perpetrators, states can be found responsible for geno-
cide.15 Ultimately, however, the Court found that Serbia had not
committed genocide since it was not conclusively proved that it
had the requisite specific intent.16 In common law terms, Serbia’s
actus reus was present, but without the mandatory mens rea.17
Consequently, the ICJ did not require the payment of reparations,
electing instead to issue a declaration and require compliance with
ICTY rulings.18 The ICJ opinion exclusively dealt with genocide
in the narrow legal sense of the term incorporating dolus speciailis
(specific intent). This stands in contrast to the colloquial meaning
of “genocide,” which at times has been used by the media and pol-
icymakers to classify crimes against humanity as genocide with the
hope of rallying public opinion behind intervention. Legally, how-
ever, it is specific intent that distinguishes genocide from other
crimes against humanity and human rights abuses generally. Thus,
it was insufficient to merely establish that Serbian forces deliber-
ately and unlawfully killed Bosnian Muslims. Rather, the Court
required proof that the killings were committed with the intent to
destroy the group, the Bosniaks of Srebrenica.19
The end result of the Bosnian Genocide case is that for the first
time genocide is a crime for which states should be held responsi-
ble.20 But the Court did not stop there, further determining that
“the obligation to prevent genocide necessarily implies the prohibi-
tion of the commission of genocide.”21 Thus, the ICJ has taken one
step forward in holding states accountable for genocide. In the final
analysis, however, the ICJ took another step back in setting the evi-
dentiary bar impossibly high to prove state intent. The core diffi-
culty remains: “The [Genocide] Convention definition of genocide
requires proof of specific intent. It is hard to conceive of a state
with specific intent.”22 Without evidence proving that a state’s
leaders possessed the specific intent at the crucial time, it is impos-
sible to prove genocide.23 This intent requirement is what defeated
Bosnia’s Article IX claim that Serbia had committed genocide.24
Requiring Direct Evidence to Establish Specific
Intent Makes Genocide Impossible to Prove
Without Unequivocal Documentation and has the
Effect of Reducing Political Pressure on
Genocidal Regimes
By applying the specific intent requirement in such a strin-
gent manner, the ICJ has arguably limited prosecution of genocide
to situations where there is “smoking-gun” evidence or its equiva-
lent.25 Unlike in World War II, there was no Wannsee Conference
in Belgrade to decide on the implementation of a “final solution”
for Bosnia’s Muslims.26 Indeed, the ICJ’s decision makes it
extremely difficult to prove state-sponsored genocidal intent. The
state is a nebulous and multifaceted entity; doubtless various lead-
ers at various times had competing rationales for their actions. The
standard laid down by the Court is fully conclusive and beyond
any doubt, not beyond a reasonable doubt.27 A state may then com-
mit all of the objective elements of genocide, but could legitimate
them on the basis of military strategy, or even ethnic cleansing.28
As long as its officials kept incomplete records that raise doubt as
to actual intent, the state will likely not be held accountable for
genocide. The ICJ reasoned that this high-level of certainty is com-
miserate with the seriousness of the allegation.29 Yet, this require-
ment also has the effect of setting an extraordinarily high bar for
finding states responsible by essentially mandating discovery from
suspect regimes. 
To illustrate this effect, consider the example of the ICJ’s
holding that the “six strategic aims of the Serb people,” which were
adopted by the Bosnian Serb Parliament on May 12, 1992 and
included the goal of “separat[ing] [the] Serbian people [into] two
national communities.”30 This did not constitute evidence of state-
sponsored genocidal intent,31 and is consistent with ICTY prece-
dent, which exclusively addresses individual responsibility for
genocide.32 However, the decision not to hold the six strategic
goals tantamount to state-sponsored genocide will make genocide
exceedingly challenging to prove in future cases involving states,
and has the effect of undermining the object and purpose of the
Genocide Convention itself. 
Publicly holding states accountable for genocide increases the
political pressure on genocidal regimes for change. By using an
impossibly high standard measuring subjective intent at the
expense of any objective indicia, the Bosnian Genocide decision will
mean that the stigma of genocide will most likely be unavailable as
a tool to exert pressure. This occurred when the UN Commission
in Darfur concluded that the atrocities were not genocide because
there was no evidence of specific intent to destroy only the non-
Arab “black tribes.”33 The ICJ’s holding in Bosnian Genocide serves
to solidify the requirement of uncontroverted, complete evidence
to establish specific state intent. A pattern of abuses, or even effec-
tive control by the state or an official organ, is insufficient to prove
genocide without direct evidence of the state’s intent to commit
genocide. 
The Court’s refusal to infer intent from a pattern of abuse
ultimately defeated Bosnia’s arguments. Serbia’s notorious backing
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of a proxy army, the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS), has been
conclusively documented by the ICTY. Serbia’s connection with
the VRS also appears to be confirmed by evidence which Serbia
was permitted by the ICTY to keep classified due to purported
national security concerns. The New York Times has reported that
these files, including minutes of the Supreme Defense Council
(SDC), a top decision-making body in Yugoslavia during the
1992-1995 Bosnian conflict, address Serbia’s control and direc-
tion, “revealing in new and vivid detail how Belgrade financed and
supplied the war in Bosnia, and how the Bosnian Serb army,
though officially separate after 1992, remained virtually an exten-
sion of the Yugoslav Army.”34 Portions of the SDC records that
have been made public suggest that Belgrade was paying the
salaries of VRS officers as late as 1998.35 Rosalyn Higgins has
refused to comment on the Court’s decision not to subpoena the
full records, saying that the “findings speak for themselves,”
though the dissent of Judge Khasawneh notes that several uncon-
vincing reasons had been given for not considering the records,
such as a fear of taking sides, state sovereignty, or embarrassment if
Serbia refused the Court’s order.36 Regardless of the motivation,
the Court’s refusal to consider these records and ultimate holding
creates a loophole in the Genocide Convention system that states
with genocidal ambitions may exploit.37 In the future, states with
genocidal ambitions may similarly be successful in withholding
evidence, if it exists in the first place, that would be dispositive of
specific intent. Such an outcome would further frustrate the
Court’s evidentiary requirements and ultimately the effectiveness
of the Genocide Convention. The legacy of the case is that “if
Serbia’s actions don’t amount to State complicity in genocide, it is
hard to envision what would.”38
Scholarly commentary is divided on the specific intent analy-
sis from Bosnian Genocide. An illustration of the ongoing debate is
the contrast between Eric Posner, who supports the ICJ’s decision
in the name of political reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia,39
and David Luban who derides the ICJ’s reluctance to infer genoci-
dal intent from a pattern of continuous abuses and war crimes.40
The Court ruled that a pattern of conduct will only be accepted as
evidence of its existence if genocide is the only possible explanation
for the conduct.41 Judge Antonio Cassese, the first President of the
ICTY, has attacked the Bosnian Genocide judgment as demanding
an “unrealistically high standard of proof.”42
Neither side of the debate is entirely satisfied with the ICJ’s
opinion.43 A Bosnian legal victory has been seen by commentators
as a political impasse that would only further polarize an already
volatile region.44 Posner argues that if Serbia were found to have
committed genocide, then Serbian nationalists could use collective
war guilt for their fanatical ends, reminiscent of how the Nazis
used popular discontent with the Treaty of Versailles.45 The
President of the ICJ, Rosalyn Higgins, has firmly asserted that the
Bosnian Genocide opinion was not a political compromise.46 Even
so, it remains an open question, as Posner has argued, whether the
Bosnia-Serbia proceedings “may end up illustrating the limits of
international law, rather than vindicating its ideals.”47
Applying the ICTY Standard for State Control
Would Have Lead the Court to a Different Outcome
The ICJ overwhelmingly held that the acts of “those who
committed genocide” at Srebrenica cannot be attributed to Serbia
due to a lack of effective control over the operations.48 The Court
concluded that the decision to kill the adult male Muslim popula-
tion of Srebrenica was taken by some members of the VRS Main
Staff, but without instructions from the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY).49 The Court relied on Article VIII of the
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the
Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts,50 which
considers the issue of state control through the lens of official
organs that are being directed by the state.51 An exact definition of
“control,” however, has been left to the courts to interpret. The ICJ
relied on the Nicaragua effective “operational control”52 standard
in making this determination.53 Nicaragua requires that a country’s
control over paramilitaries or other non-state actors can only be
established if the actors in questions act in “complete dependence”
on the state.54 The ICJ found that the requisite level of depend-
ency did not exist between Serbia, the VRS, and paramilitary
forces.55
The ICTY has also considered the questions of attribution
and control in its prosecution of individuals accused of perpetrat-
ing genocide. For example, in the Krstić and Blagojević cases, the
ICTY found that Bosnian Serb forces killed over 7,000 Bosnian
Muslim men following the takeover of Srebrenica in July 1995.56
In its reasoning, the ICTY relied on the Tadic “overall control”
standard. The ICTY held that where a state has a role in organiz-
ing and coordinating, in addition to providing support for a group,
it has sufficient overall control, and the group’s acts are attributa-
ble to the state.57 In sum, the ICTY accords a different and more
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flexible standard of attribution than the ICJ, as made clear in the
following passage:
[T]he Appeals Chamber holds the view that international rules
do not always require the same degree of control over armed
groups or private individuals for the purpose of determining
whether an individual not having the status of a State official
under internal legislation can be regarded as a de facto organ of
the State. The extent of the requisite State control varies.58
The ICTY relied on this analysis to rule that that: “The acts
committed at Srebrenica … were committed with the specific
intent to destroy in part the group of the Muslims of Bosnia-
Herzegovina … these were acts of genocide.”59 In so finding, the
majority interpreted the decision of the ICJ in Nicaragua as requir-
ing the government of a state to exercise “effective” control over the
operations of a military force in order for the acts of that force to
be imputed to the state.60 In contrast, the ICJ in Bosnian Genocide
required unequivocal proof of “full awareness” and complicity in
the commission of genocide.61
The distinction between the Nicaragua and Tadic standards is
whether or not the state must be in direct control of operational
planning. Dr. Marc Weller, Director of the European Centre for
Minority Issues, argues that the Nicaragua standard relates to the
specific case of the trigger point for self-defense, and attribution in
relation to the use of force. In the Bosnian Genocide case, “we are
dealing with the implementation of an obligation positively to pre-
vent genocide, where a different standard of attribution should
apply.” In essence, Weller argues that the Caroline criterion for self-
defense is not an appropriate standard to use in genocide cases.
The Court used the restrictive Nicaragua test of state control so as
not to create an exception to UN Charter Article 2(4), which per-
mits the use of force in self-defense. Without such a stringent stan-
dard, states would be permitted to use force in self-defense against
other states regardless of whether the attacking state had absolute
control over the forces attacking the defending state. While this
makes sense to limit the use of force in international relations and
international law generally, applying the same logic to cases of
genocide makes it easier, not harder, for states to use force, albeit
not against a foreign aggressor, but against their own population.62
Thus, the Tadic test is better-suited to deal with allegations of
genocide than Nicaragua. This distinction is significant enough to
potentially decide the case’s outcome. 
The key to the Court’s decision is its focus on Srebrenica,
rather than the entire VRS campaign against Bosnian Muslims.63
This decision does not sufficiently consider the coordinated cam-
paign by the VRS that occurred throughout the war. Specifically,
the ICJ did not give an exhaustive account of other acts potentially
established a pattern of offenses from which a Serbia’s genocidal
intent could be logically inferred. In its June 16, 2004 decision, the
ICTY trial chamber said that “there is sufficient evidence that
genocide was committed in Brcko, Prijedor, Sanski Most,
Srebrenica, Bijeljina, Kljuc and Bosanski Novi.”64 In so doing, the
ICJ has missed the forest (patterns of ongoing genocide) for a tree
(Srebrenica). In its argument, the Court emphasized that, at the
time the decision to commit genocide was made, the connection
between Belgrade and the Srebrenica massacre did not conclusively
demonstrate intent “to eliminate physically the adult male popula-
tion of the Muslim community.”65 In other words, the Court held
that it could not be conclusively established that, “at the crucial
time, the FRY supplied aid to the perpetrators of the genocide in
full awareness that the aid supplied would be used to commit
genocide.”66 Had the Court used the Tadic “effective control” test
in an analysis of the entire Yugoslav war, rather than exclusively
focusing on whether or not there was complete operational control
at the “crucial time,” it would likely have reached a different out-
come. The ICJ’s juxtaposition of influence and control are also dif-
ficult to distinguish; there is no legal yardstick to be applied.
Although there is no guarantee that applying Tadic would have
changed the Court’s final decision, it does seem likely that, given
the extensive documentation of Serbia’s links with the FRY, the ICJ
would have held Serbia accountable as the ICTY has held individ-
ual defendants responsible for the genocide at Srebrenica.67
The ICJ Bosnian Genocide Opinion Sets a High
Duty on States to Prevent Genocide
Defining the Limits of the “All Measures” Doctrine
The ICJ held in Bosnian Genocide that the FRY leadership,
including President Milosević, was fully aware that there was a
serious risk of genocide in Srebrenica. This activates the obligation to
prevent genocide enshrined in Article I of the Genocide
Convention.68 The legal issue then is whether Serbia took all the
measures which were within its power to prevent the genocide.
The Court held it did not, finding that Serbia could, and should,
have acted to prevent the genocide.69 It therefore violated its
Article IX obligations under the Genocide Convention.70
More broadly, and boldly, however, the ICJ held that States
Parties must employ all means at their disposal to prevent persons
or groups not directly under their authority from committing an
act of genocide or any of the other acts mentioned in Article III.71
This obligation is one of conduct and not of result: “responsibility
is not incurred simply because genocide occurs but rather if the
state manifestly failed to take all means to prevent genocide which
was within its power, and which might have contributed to pre-
venting the genocide.”72 Thus, for a state to be held responsible for
breaching its obligation to prevent genocide, it does not need to be
proven that the state concerned definitely had the power to prevent
the genocide: “it is sufficient that it had the means to do so and
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that it manifestly refrained from using them.”73 This holding puts
the U.S., the UNSC, and other states with the means (military and
otherwise) to prevent genocide in an awkward situation — exactly
how far does this new doctrine of aggressively stamping out geno-
cide reach?
Bosnian Genocide Fortifies the Emerging Right 
of Humanitarian Intervention in Cases of State-
Sponsored Genocide
The prohibition on genocide has long been regarded as one
of the few undoubted examples of jus cogens,74 a peremptory norm
from which no derogation is permitted, and is also an erga omnes
(towards all) obligation of states.75 Article I of the Genocide
Convention classifies genocide as “a crime under international
law,” which entitles a state with no direct interest to sue for failure
to prevent and punish the crime.76 This treaty language arguably
makes humanitarian intervention legally permissible without
UNSC authorization. In the aftermath of the Bosnian Genocide
case, this debate reached a new pitch with the apparent endorse-
ment by the ICJ of a more aggressive role for states to take all meas-
ures necessary to actively prevent genocide.77
In 1947, referring to the General Assembly Resolution 96(I),
which would become the Genocide Convention, Raphael Lemkin
wrote that: “[b]y declaring genocide a crime under international
law … the right of intervention on behalf of minorities slated for
destruction has been established.”78 Nowhere, however, does the
Genocide Convention recognize that individual states or the inter-
national community may or must intervene to prevent genocide.79
Only in the late 1980s did humanitarian intervention begin to win
acceptance in the international community.80 In 1991, the UNSC
authorized military action to prevent atrocities directed against the
Kurdish minority in Iraq, establishing a non-binding precedent
that would apply in cases of genocide.81 The question of using
humanitarian intervention to prevent genocide, up to and includ-
ing military intervention, vexed the UNSC in 1994 as genocide
raged in Rwanda. In the aftermath of its failed intervention in
Somalia, the U.S. and other Security Council members, primarily
for domestic political reasons, resisted efforts to deploy additional
peacekeepers.82
By the outbreak of war in Bosnia, Judge ad hoc Elihu
Lauterpacht, wrote that “the duty to prevent genocide is a duty
that rests upon all parties.”83 More controversial is the question of
preventing genocide wherever it may occur. To test the limits of the
all measures doctrine, Judge Lauterpacht analyzed the Whitaker
report on the prevention and punishment of genocide. He con-
cluded with the observation that “[t]he limited reaction of the par-
ties to the Genocide Convention in relation to these episodes sug-
gests the permissibility of inactivity.”84 On the other hand, the
UNSC was reluctant to apply the term “genocide” to the Rwandan
crisis. This suggests that it had been determined that the use of the
word ‘genocide’ would impose an obligation to act to prevent the
crime. The ICJ’s holding in the Bosnian Genocide case lends new
weight to this argument while leaving unclear the extent of affir-
mative state obligations to prevent genocide. 
The expansive language of the Bosnian Genocide opinion
seems to open the door for individual state initiatives to prevent
genocide, potentially with or without UNSC authorization. This
resolution ends up pitting two responsibilities against one another:
the obligation of states to refrain from the use of force, and the
emerging state obligation of preventing genocide that has to this
point only applied to prosecuting individual perpetrators. Holding
that the obligation to prevent genocide through humanitarian
intervention seems consonant with the argument that customary
international law must evolve to provide a legal justification for
humanitarian intervention in rare cases and in light of concrete cir-
cumstances recognized by states and the UNSC.85 The resultant
chaos, however, if such logic were followed to its extreme would be
“potentially as serious of a threat to international law as any geno-
cide.”86 Consequently, in the words of Professor Thomas Franck,
“there cannot be an absolute priority either for the claim of sover-
eignty (in the name of peace) or of humanity (in the name of jus-
tice).”87 A balance must be struck between the important interest
of preventing genocide with the international moratorium on the
use of force except in those situations allowed for under the UN
Charter. It is this delicate line that the ICJ has not defined by its
use of overly-broad language holding that any state with the means
to prevent genocide has the responsibility to do so. This issue will
continue to illicit not only scholarly debate, but potentially radi-
cally divergent state practice, as a result.
Conclusion
The differing standards of specific intent, state control, and
the emerging state obligation to prevent genocide largely deter-
mined the ICJ’s decision in Bosnian Genocide. First, the require-
ment of direct evidence to solidify the amorphous concept of state
intent will make genocide exceedingly difficult to prove in future
cases. This holding highlights the inherent jurisprudential discon-
nections in the horizontally hierarchical international tribunal sys-
tem that not only reduces certainty in international law, but, in the
case of genocide, has reduced political pressure on genocidal
regimes and curtailed the effectiveness of the Genocide
Convention. Second, on the issue of state control the Nicaragua
and Tadic standards have lead to contradictory results as seen
through the analysis of the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnian
Genocide. The ICJ’s reliance on Nicaragua was both inappropriate
and a setback for state responsibility to prevent genocide. Finally,
the expansive but ill-defined all measures standard put forth by the
ICJ has the potential for crystallizing the emerging obligation of
humanitarian intervention. In the short-term, the Bosnian
Genocide judgment could affect future trials at the ICTY.88 The
ICTY will either follow the ICJ’s ruling, or distinguish its cases.
Judges will be faced with the fact that the Tribunal is deferential to,
though not bound by, ICJ precedent, and may therefore apply the
Nicaragua standard for state control. Though there is the possibil-
ity that Tadic may still be appropriate in differentiating ICTY cases
dealing with individuals as opposed to states. This accommodation
would maintain deference to the ICJ while ensuring that the per-
petrators of genocide do not escape justice. 
The ICJ broke new ground in Bosnian Genocide by unambigu-
ously holding that states can be held responsible for committing
genocide. It has, however, simultaneously handicapped its holding
by ignoring objective evidence pointing to a systematic pattern of
genocide and instead requiring proof of direct specific state intent.
That being said, in critiquing Bosnian Genocide, it is important to
recall that, despite its significant drawbacks, for the first time since
1948 when the Genocide Convention was adopted a country has
been put on trial before the ICJ for genocide. In the convoluted his-
tory of state accountability for human rights abuses, this represents
a step forward, one which could, in time, overshadow the short-
comings in the Court’s final ruling in Bosnian Genocide.89 HRB
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